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By international and historical standards, Australia is a very quiet place.
Despite this appearance, things of world-historical significance have
happened here. Few conquests have been so systematic and brutal as that of
Aboriginal society. Here our quiet is deceptively a product of the very
severity of the conquest and consequently, an active silencing of historical
guilt and possible arguments about reparations. The other event of world
historical importance is Australia's post-war immigration. Again, the
quiet of this place deceives. It has been a programme of incomparable size
internationally in the past half-century: a first world society with low
birth rates has doubled its population, to a significant extent through
immigration, in forty years. No other nation-state has been as actively
involved in the recruitment of immigrants. Nowhere have the sources of
immigrants been so diverse.
D efining A ustralia
Settler colonialism and mass immigration gave a special flavour to
attempts to construct an ideology of the Australian nation. According to
Benedict Anderson, 1987 was the 200th anniversary of the birth of the
nation state. The "extraordinary invention" which was to become an
"unproblematic planetary norm" came to the world, says Anderson, in the
shape of the Constitution of the United States of America.* The nation
whose 200th anniversary we are called upon to celebrate in 1988 was
founded just one year later. That would make it the first completely
modem nation.
This view of Australia may put quite a strain on our credulity: did the
convicts know they were coming to found a nation? Did they want to? Do
the descendants of the Aborigines who saw the First Fleet land see things
that way? Was a nation founded at all? After all, our monarch still lives
overseas; many of our basic institutions are imported from our former
Imperial ruler. If so, when was it founded? In 1788, in 1901 at the time of
Federation, with the Statute of Westminster in 1928 or when appeals to the
Privy Council were abolished in the mid-1980s? But what is a nation
anyway, in a world in which crucial economic and political decisions are
no longer made at the national level, especially for the smaller states?
It is necessary to grapple with some of the more significant recent
attempts at making nationhood. In particular, we want to look at the effort
to define the Australian nation as "multicultural", which began in the early
1970s, and continues, despite some controversy, to enjoy the support of all
major political forces.
Multiculturalism is an ideology which calls for a celebration of cultural
diversity, as an ongoing feature of Australian society.^ It thus appears as a
departure from previously prevailing racist and nationalistic stereotypes
of the nation. But this progressive move bears problems: how is the
tension between ethnic pluralism and the cohesiveness of society as a

whole to be resolved? How can a nation be defined, if not in terms of
ethnic identity: shared history, traditions, culture and language? How are
core values and acceptable behavioural forms to be laid down, if the
dominance of Anglo-Australian culture is no longer accepted? The
problems of a multi-ethnic state are neither new nor unique in the world,
but the response of multiculturalism is certainly a new departure in the
history of Australia. So we must ask what multiculturalism means, and if
it is a viable way of defining the nation.
But we must also ask if it is to be taken at face value. Has it really
changed the ethnocentric structures which are so entrenched in every area
of Australian life? Is it even meant to? It is also seen by some as a form of
social control, a way of incorporating ethnic middle classes into the
Australian political system, and using them to control their less successful
compatriots, at a low cost to the stated
TTie year 200 is a good moment to discuss attempts to define the nation,
for the most obvious of these attempts is the Bicentenary itself. The
Bicentennial Authority has been working for nearly a decade to:
... "plan, co-ordinate and promote a year long programme
of local, national and international activities and events to
celebrate Australia's Bicentenary and to involve 16 million
Australians in the celebrations and events of 1988".4
As a planned, state-run exercise in the creation of a national idea, the
Bicentenary is almost without precedent: for a whole year we are called
upon to "join in the activities of 1988 and to celebrate what it means to be
Australian".5
The Bicentenary is to be multicultural. We are told that "Australians
will really be "Living Together" in 1988". The Bicentennial Authority has
developed a "set of planning objectives" to achieve this:
To celebrate the richness of diversity of Australians, their
traditions and the freedoms which they enjoy.
To encourage all Australians to understand and preserve
their heritage, recognize the m ulticultural nature of
modern Australia, and look to the future with confidence.
To ensure that all Australians participate in, or have access
to, the activities of 1988, so that the Bicentenary will be a
truly national programme in both character and geographic
spread.6
There we have it: we must be multicultural to be national. And how
shall we do it? The Authority tells us:
Plant shrubs, hedges and trees... make community litter
bags... Re-enact an episode from your district's past...
Make a census of the headstones... Organize an Australiana
Trivial Pursuit Game... Bake an Australia-shaped cake for
a raffle... Plan to have a meal from a different culture at
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least once a month in 1988... Paint a giant Bicentennial
Living Together sign..7
But whatever you do, don't remind the public of unpleasant realities. In
1987, the Bicentennial Authority asked Ms. Franca Arena, a NSW State
Labor MP and Justice Michael Kirby, President of the NSW Court of
Appeal to write articles for its glossy journal Bicentenary 1988. M s.
Arena wrote of migrants' encounters with "racists, bigots and intolerant
people", and called for Australia to become a republic, since the monarchy
was meaningless for many Australians. Justice Kirby described the unjust,
destructive and discriminatory impact of the legal system on Aboriginal
culture, and drew attention to concern about the disproportionate number
of Aboriginals in jail. Their articles were rejected. O ur image of
multicultural Australia is meant to be at the level of Trivial Pursuit: song
and dance, food and folklore.
The Bicentenary itself is likely to be forgotten soon enough. It is one of
history's one-night stands. But it is part of a long tradition of attempts to
define Australia, and what it means to be Australian. Why is there such a
need to do this? Donald Horne has pointed to the process of "realitycreation" required to establish new nation states:
"There are many characteristics a new nation-state might
be seen as having. Only some of them prevail. In the
processes that precede the formation of new nation-states
great acts of imaginative construction occur, out of which
the new nation is born".8
There is no doubt that the creation of a national ideology is part of the
political process of establishing the nation. The question of which national
characteristics prevail, depends on the balance of social forces within this
process. Those who have the power to create and rule a nation-state, have
the most influence in defining the "national character". The definition may
embody abstract ideals (liberty-equality-fraternity) and it might satisfy a
popular desire to "belong", but is linked just as much to the economic and
political interests of the definers.
Now, if we are to follow Anderson, we all belong to "new nations", for
all modern nations are a product of the last two centuries, being closely
linked to the economic and political processes of world developm ent.^
Nor is the "reality creation" of the national character something that
happens once, at the beginning of a new nation. 10 Rather there is a
constant process of asserting, questioning, re-defining and examining the
national identity. As Home writes:
"The great drama, endlessly playing, is that of maintaining
definitions of the nation and its social order: definitions are
being repeated daily, hourly, of what the nation and society
are." 11
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So Australia's definers are doing what those of all nations do, when they
put forward a national image. But they seem to do with more regularity
and fervour. Richard White starts his book on "Inventing Australia" by
calling it "the history of a national obsession". He points out that
"Australia has long supported a whole industry of image-makers to tell us
what we are".12 White does not tell us why Australia should be a fore
runner in this field. We may speculate that the cause lies in some of the
ambiguities of the Australian condition. In seizing what they called empty
land, the colonists denied the humanity of their Aboriginal predecessors'
very existence. For the white invaders, there was no history before 1788.
This Australian nationalism had to start from a year zero, or it has to
regard itself as part of the history of the"British race". 13 Australia grew
as part of the British Empire. Unlike the USA, India or Britain's other
far-flung possessions, Australia never managed a decent independence
movement, let alone ajiberation struggle. Australia was made a nation by
an Act of the British parliament in 1901. The creation of a nation in a
struggle for independence is usually the pre-eminent moment for the
definition of national character, language, culture and myths. Australia
has missed out on this, and has therefore had to make a more conscious
effort to define itself. The task has not been made easier by its
geographical position. On the other side of the world from its "mother
country" and sitting on the edge of Asia, the maintenance of Britishness
put a strain on resourcefulness and imagination, especially as Britain's
economy has faded and its Empire has crumbled.
White has documented the changing attempts to define the "Australian
type": the muscular sunburnt bushman, the "Coming Man", whose selfreliance and physical prowess would renew the British race, the Digger,
who proved himself at Gallipoli, the Bondi lifesaver:
The emphasis was on masculinity, and on masculine
friendships and team-work, or "mateship" in Australia. All
the cliches - man of action, white man, manliness, the
common man, war as a test of manhood - were not sexist
for nothing. Women were excluded from the image of the
"Coming Man", and so were excluded from the image of
the Australian type as well. 14
Being Australian has always been defined in sexist terms. It has also
been defined in racist terms. In the early days, the pioneers' battle against
the hard land was also seen as a struggle against the dangerous and wily
blacks. Later the fight was against migrants who would dilute the British
character of the nation, and undermine the race. The main threat was the
"yellow peril" and above all the Chinese who started coming in the mid19th century. But there was hostility towards all "non-Britishers". One of
the first Acts of the new parliament in 1901 was to pass the Immigration
Restriction Act, designed to keep out non-European immigrants, and
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popularly known as the White Australia Policy. Humphrey MacQueen has
drawn attention to the role of racism in the construction of the Australian
labour movement. 15 The restriction of immigration and the call for a
white Australia were themes which had mobilized workers and their
organizations - the unions and the Australian Labor Party in the latter half
of the 19th century and which would continue to do so until the Second
World War.
The Immigration Restriction Act was not generally used to keep out
European settlers, although they were relatively few in number until
1947. Those who did come encountered considerable hostility. Australian
workers were often unwilling to work with them. In the isolationist mood
of the Depression era, attempts were made to exclude non-British
migrants, and to combat the influence on other cultures within Australia.
At Kalgoorlie in 1934 several people were killed in "anti-dago" riots. 16
Attempts by employers to employ new migrants at low wages or to recruit
them as strike breakers did not help matters.
So the Australian type was constructed in terms of the white, masculine
outdoor person originating from the British Isles. Even that was
contradictory enough in the light of the struggles between English and
Irish. These came to a head during the First World War in the context of
the Irish fight for Independence and the conflict on conscription in
Australia. The concept "Anglo-Celtic", commonly used in debates on
multiculturalism today, is an ill-conceived monstrosity, which can only
partially paper over the gulf. One of the problems of defining the
Australian nation is that its supposed sub-stratum - the British nation does not exist either. There is indeed a British nation-state, but it uneasily
embraces at least four nations (or ethnic groups). 1*7
There is, however, another side to the Australian type which was being
constructed before 1945. The muscular bushman/digger/life-saver was
working-class. He was a "battler", who did not take kindly to authority. It
was a populist image, that fitted into the concept of Australia as a
"workers' paradise", where there were no aristocrats, where there was no
entrenched privilege, where everyone had a chance of success. This side of
the Australian type is summed up in the ideas of "mateship" and "a fair
^

^

§t)

n

.

How realistic was the image? From the earliest days, of European
settlement, there was a strong measure of inequality in Australia. A landed
oligarchy developed rapidly, and later merged with trading and
manufacturing interests. There were class struggles throughout the 19th
century, with the high demand for labour in the boom following the Gold
Rush giving impetus to labour organization. The w ealthier classes'
demand for immigrant workers, and the existing working class' fear of
dilution of labour were central political themes for much of the 19th
c e n tu ry .
Contrary to ideas of the open frontier and individualism, the
state played a central role in Australian development. First it was the
British Imperial state, later the governments of the states and the
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Commonwealth, but always there was a high degree of bureaucratic
control. The idea of the individualistic bushman is clearly ambiguous. On
the one hand it was an attempt to assert populist values against the ruling
class and the state. On the other, it was an officially propagated image,
useful to conceal the reality of a highly stratified, bureaucratized and
increasingly urbanized society. Crocodile Dundee has had many
predecessors.
Australia's self-image, therefore, has always been problematic. It has
been racist, justifying genocide and exclusionism, and denying the role of
non-British migrants. It has been sexist, ignoring the role of women in
national development, and justifying their subordinate position. It has
idealized the role of the "common man" in a situation of growing
inequality and increasingly rigid class divisions. It has been been
misleading, in its attempt to create a British/Australian ethnicity, while
ignoring the divisions with the British nation-state, and its Australian off
shoot.
But for all that, the image might have been maintained, had it not been
for Australia's post-war immigration programme. The mass settlement of
migrants from a wide range of countries has made the overt maintenance
of a racist definition of the nation and of the Australian type impossible.
Today, an attem pt is being made to re-interpret the imm igration
programme as a deliberate move towards a multi-ethnic society. That is
far from the truth: immigration was seen in the mid-1940s as a strategic
necessity to make the country economically and militarily strong enough
to repel the "yellow peril". No ethnic diversity was intended: British
migrants were wanted, and when they could not be obtained in adequate
numbers, the call was for "assimilable types" who would rapidly become
indistinguishable from other Australians.
Constructing Nationalism
But cultural assimilation did not take place. Australia became a country
with at least 80 different ethnic groups. If the idea of a nation and of a
national type is needed to secure social cohesion, then Australia is faced
with a new problem: how to define these in a non-racist and non-monocultural way.
According to Ernest Gellner:
...nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which
requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across
political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries
within a given state... should not separate the powerholders from the rest. 19
In other words, nationalism is based on the idea that every ethnic group or
nation should have its own state, with all the appropriate trappings: flag,
army, Olympic team and postage stamps. People relate to these symbols. A
feeling of nation-ness is an integral part of their lived experience. But
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what happens when the people of a nation-state consist of more than one
ethnic group with different symbols and lived experiences? This is a
common enough situation, but in the nationalist view of the world, it is
likely to lead to conflict. As soon as people become conscious of their
destiny as a nation they will either subjugate the other ethnic groups within
the state boundaries, or, if they belong to a minority, they will fight for
their own state.
Pre-industrial states, including the greatest empires, were held together
not by national feeling, but by a system of power, symbolized by the
divinely appointed monarch. For a colonial subject, loyalty to the British
Crown had nothing to do with ethnicity. The modern nation-state, in its
ideal form as a democratic republic, cannot exist on this basis. Since
power belongs to the people, and is only delegated to the state (in its
classical triad of legislative, executive, judicative), legitimacy cannot rest
on loyalty to the state. The state is an instrument of the people; being loyal
to it as a tautology. Legitimacy is based on the will of the people, and that
makes it im perative to know clearly who constitutes the people:
"Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the
political and national unit should be congruent."20 The struggles to make
the state and the nation congruent have been at the root of much of the
slaughter of our century.
In fact there are very few countries today which are ethnically
homogeneous. The process of industrialization and modernization leads to
larger state units, embracing a variety of ethnic groups. There are few
advanced countries without their "old" minorities such as the Bretons in
France, the Basques and Catalans in Spain. Sometimes this often develops
into serious clearage as in Italy and in Britain. Moreover, the process of
development almost always involves rural-urban migrations which
quickly transcend national boundaries: in the 19th century the Irish came
to Britain, the Poles to Germany, the Italians to France and Switzerland,
and people from all over Europe to the USA, Canada, and some South
American countries. Since 1945, there has been large-scale labour
migration to most Western European countries, to North America and
Australia, leading to the development of significant new ethnic minorities
throughout the First World.
In encouraging labour migration, the states concerned followed short
term labour market interests, with little consideration of the long-term
consequences. There was certainly no desire to create m ulti-ethnic
societies. Now that this has happened, there are various responses: laisserfa ir e , state racism or exclusionism , assim ilationism , and m ulticulturalism. Whatever policy is followed, a new situation has to be dealt
with: membership of the collectivity is no longer simply a result of birth;
the boundary of the collectivity cannot easily be defined according to a
myth of common origin or fate. If nationalism is a crucial social ideology
then a new way must be found to define the nation. Nowhere is this
problem more pressing than in Australia, where the post-war migrations
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have been so large in scale, that they have transformed the ethnic
composition of the population. Forty percent of the Australian people
today are immigrants or children of immigrants. Half of these are of nonBritish origin.
Sixty years ago, J. Lyng could write:
The position can be compared with that of a river, started
by a small spring in the mountains, winding its way through
unknown country, gaining in volume and importance as it
flows along, till, at the end of its course, it has become a
mighty stream with incalculable potentialities. Here and
there the river is made slightly bigger by tributaries.22
The river was "English language", "English culture" and "British
stock" (an interesting juxtaposition). The tributaries were the most
"modest contributions" of "non-Britishers”. Even in the 1950s it was
possible to assert:
Our life is still British wholecloth, so to speak, and though
the warp-threads may have turned a little, they are still
strong; we have only coloured and arranged the weftthreads a little differently.23
With hindsight, we can say that such a view of the world was
ethnocentric and mistaken even then. But it did provide a workable basis
for a national ideology.
That ideology could not survive the fundamental changes resulting
from the crumbling of the British Empire, the post-war immigration
programme and increasing vocal claims by Aboriginal groups. What were
the alternatives? Other new, immigrant nations have had to contend with
this problem. It is easy to understand the concepts that can hold the USA
together, w ithout recourse to ethnic identity: they include the
revolutionary tradition, the force of new universalistic ideals, the strength
of the "American way of life", the fascination of world power, the
integrative force of modernism and innovation. Australia can only aspire
to such ideals in an imitative, second-rate way. In the 1950s, attempts to
define the nation focused on "the Australian way of life". The image was
one of a prosperous suburban society, in which every man had his house
and garden, his Holden and his hobby. Again it was a sexist image, centred
around the man as bread-winner for a neat and happy nuclear f a m i l y . 2 4
It was a new image, that could compete with increasingly irrelevant
Anglo-centric traditions. And it could draw in the New Australians: you
did not have to come from Britain to want a Holden and a house, to be a
good worker and trade unionist, and to support the idea of a fair go.
Consumerism matched the idea of assimilationism: to be Australian meant
simply to conform in terms of work and life-style. The ideology of "the
Australian way of life" appeared as the pinnacle of modernism: pride in

economic progress, technical advance and a high standard of living was to
make differences in origin, race and ethnic background meaningless.
The Rise of M ulticulturalism
But by the 1970s, this approach was failing, and there was a need for a new
national ideology. There were several reasons for this. First, the
modernist, assimilationist principle had only scratched the surface of a
society still highly elitist and dominated by Anglocentric values. Second,
the onset of recession and restructuring of the world economy was making
Australian living standards vulnerable. Third, trends towards economic
and social segmentation linked to race, ethnicity and gender were making
the whole concept of the "Australian way of life" questionable. The idea of
of "multiculturalism" was an attempt to modify existing concepts of the
nation to match up to the new realities.
Whitlam's Minister of Immigration, A1 Grassby, announced his version
of a "multi-cultural society of the future" in 1973. The Labor Government
made efforts to take account of "migrant needs" in its social policies. From
1975, Fraser's neo-conservative government took up the slogan, and by the
end of the decade had worked multiculturalism up into a full-blown
ideology for the Australian nation. Multiculturalism has been embraced by
the Hawke Labor Government, which was elected in 1983, and by the
various state governments, and remains a multi-party concensus.
Australian multiculturalism has two facets. The first is "ethnic politics",
which began as part of a programme of social democratic reform. As such
it was not without its intrinsic merits. In the area of education for example,
specialist English-as-a-Second-Language teaching was a genuine attempt to
right the specific disadvantage suffered by children of non-English
speaking background. Multicultural policy in education prescribed social
reform, based on an understanding that some groups are disadvantaged.
Cultural patterns, viewed by "ethnic politics" as group life-chances and
wider structural relations, needed to be changed.
The second facet is the social policy of "cultural pluralism" which came
to be the official embodiment of the multicultural response to ethnic politics
as neo-conservatism gained sway. In some senses cultural pluralism did
almost the opposite of ethnic politics. It did not set out to reform society. It
merely wished to describe society as it was in order to celebrate its
diversity.
For cultural pluralism the culture in multiculturalism must be those
things which "already exist" in diversity": the "interesting" and the
"colourful", personal "lifestyles" and "relationships", "identifications" and
"points of view". These belong to "the essentially private domain of family
and religious b e l i e f " . 25 This world is also the realm of "folk art ...,
dancing, music, craft and literature ...." 26
In some senses, "ethnic politics" and cultural pluralism are at odds. The
two views, however, often exist simultaneously in self-contradiction. On
the one hand, the focus is on getting into the same cultural act as the
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dominant groups. On the other hand, the focus is on maintaining the
diversity (which often, and perhaps conveniently, happens not to be a
diversity of social equals). On the one hand, there are de-facto arguments
for structural assimilation without tears (with the cultural imperatives and
ethos that accompany this). On the other hand, there is an ideology of
pluralism, implacably hostile to any suggestion that assimilation might be
going on. On the one hand, there is a view that m igrants are
"disadvantaged" and need to learn new cultural skills which open up
m obility opportunities. On the other hand, the same thing is called
"diversity" which is to be cherished and left alone. On the one hand, social
prescription is a rationale for reform. On the other hand, social description
is a celebration of what is.
But, having said this, there are also elements of consistency to be found
between ethnic politics and cultural pluralism. First, cultural pluralism is a
handy and inexpensive solution to the problem of ethnic politics. Second,
both cultural pluralism and ethnic politics transpose, albeit by slightly
different logics, debates about the plight of minorities from a realm which
might in part involve critical structural analysis, to an analysis simply of
"culture" or "ethnicity".
The most fundamental question then, is why bother trivializing the
notion of culture? W hatever the inadequacies of a theory, such as the
reformist vision of ethnic politics, which tries to give all social groups
tickets in the lottery of social m obility, at least it admits social
disadvantage and wants to find ways of righting it. But when the
multiculturalists attempt to discuss what they mean by the culture we can
find in diversity, they shift from social prescription to social description,
from the imperatives of reform to a celebration of what exists. At best,
multiculturalism is an escape, a consolation for "the increasing alienation
of the individual from the complexities and pressure of modern society.
The nation is simply too large, too amorphous, too remote and impersonal
to offer a satisfactory basis for wider relationships".27 Cultural pluralism
in other w ords can help overcom e or prevent the insecurity,
homogenization and loss of personal identity characteristic of mass
society. It is possible to retreat into culture narrowly defined. But there is
a sense in which this is precisely the effect of that brand of ethnic politics
which merely sees multiculturalism as the removal of "cultural" or
attitudinal barriers from minority groups to play the core cultural game,
which remains fundamentally unquestioned.
The New Right and the Attack on M ulticulturalism
Multiculturalism has been attacked recently in the media. We find both
the old-style racist populism of Geoffrey Blainey (a prominent historian)
and of Bruce Ruxton (President of the Victorian branch of the Returned
Services League), and the more subtle racism of the so-called New Right.
The focus of debate has been the increasing proportion of migrants who
come to Australia from Asia.
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The "New Right" recognizes and abhors the crisis of unitary national
identity. It puts this down in large measure to the destructive influence of a
"new class" of trendy left intellectuals and public servants. By the late
1980s, wrote David Barnett in the news magazine The Bulletin, there were
thousands of government employees in the multicultural industry with a
"vested interest in perpetuating separate ethnic identities". The perceptions
of this "New Right" are frequently very shrewd, even if their call for
"Anglomorphy" (following English values and life-styles) is a rather
bizarre aspiration for Indo-Chinese immigrants, in contra-distinction to the
somewhat different aspiration to success in the competitive world of wage
labour and commodity production. "Hard multiculturalism", in order to
preserve "ethnic integrity", it is pointed out, is equally liable to assist in the
reproduction of traditions and values that often grotesquely ignorant and
both racist as sexist.28 Furthermore, as L J.M . Cooray argues in the New
Right journal Q uadrant, multiculturalism is based on a "retrogressive
conception of culture", static and seeking to retard, naively against against
inevitable pressures, the process of cultural interaction and evolution.29
Both the populists like Blainey and the intellectual "New Right"
represent revived versions of a racist conception of Australian identity. At
the most fundamental level, both Blainey and the "New Right" recommend
an ideology of unitary identity and self-assurance about the superiority of
the industrial society we live in. Partly reminiscent of the glories of English
colonial ideology, both inject an element of English-ness into their
characterization of this society. Both advocate assimilation as the most
desirable approach to cultural difference. In articulating these views, they
advocate a return to the past, in critical appraisal of the development of
multiculturalism and cultural pluralism generally. These are the roots of
their brand of racism.
At more superficial levels, Blainey falls into modes of discourse which
are more immediately and inevitably racist. Diagnosing as he does the
visible phenotypical and cultural differences of "Asian"-ness to be Ihe
significant problem of racism, both in nineteenth century Australia and
today, is to accept at face value the racist interpretative framework of some
of the historical and social actors. Rather, visible differences are not
themselves the problem. The problem is the ideology of racism as a means
of (mis)-interpreting social division. Blainey follows those social actors he
considers to be significant into the misconception of a supposed reality of
"race" as the problem rather than "racism" as ideology.
The "New Right", on the other hand, whilst equally convinced of the
virtues and supposedly inevitable realities of assimilation, evidently think
the cultural difference of "Asian"-ness less great than Blainey and thus that
"Anglomorphy", for any immigrant convinced of the virtues of the free
enterprise society, is a viable and desirable process. Of course, in this there
are very obvious assumptions about the incompatibility and undesirability
of on-going cultural difference, in which frequently racist assumptions are
not so deeply submerged.
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Blainey and the "New Right" are not simply temporary and unpalatable
social commentators. They reiterate the official policy and the dominant
popular ideology of the decades up to the mid-1970s and reflect some
fundamental structural and cultural processes which still persist, despite
some of the pretensions of the happy ideology of cultural pluralism of the
1980s.
Options for Australia
The dilemma is evident: the now dominant paradigm of Australia as a
multicultural society will not sustain a nationalism able to perform its
traditional ideological function. Put simply, the project of imagining
communality, imagining the shared mission of the nation, imagining our
domestic progress as all of us move simultaneously through history, is
torn apart by the paradigm of cultural difference that replaces
assimilation. Apart from the material fact that we can no longer believe
strongly in the reality of that progress, we now also imagine formally
equal and culturally relative differences, of ethnicity, gender or
"lifestyle". But the "New Right" project of advocating a revival of
nationalism as a way of resolving our social and economic woes is equally
problematic: Its assimlationist assumptions have failed in the past, and will
continue to fail due to the demographic diversity and socio-economic
segmentation of Australian society.
Equally important in causing the breakdown of Australian nationalism
is the growing internationalisation of the economy. The decisions which
determine Australian living standards and income distribution are today
made on the stock-markets of Tokyo and New York, rather than by
Australian governments. International commodity design and production
and improving communications in turn cause an erosion of national life
styles and cultures. These themes cannot be pursued further here.
So what possibilities are available to Australia as we enter the third
century of white settlement? We see four options:
1) Inequality plus imagined community
This means the continued integration of the economy as part of the world
market, but with the development of a strong ideological basis for national
identity, leading to a general commitment to the Australian nation-state.
This option, as spelt out by the "New Right" seems highly unlikely to
succeed, given the problems of Australian national identity described.
Attempts to create a general "we-feeling" through sport, life-style
symbols or indeed through the Bicentenary have had no enduring success.
2^ Inequality plus state repression
This is the "Latin American" model, in which social and political
divisions become too sharp to be accommodated in concensus-type
parliamentary politics. If the Australian economy really moves into the
"Banana Republic" mode envisaged by Treasurer Keating in 1986, and no
equitable way of sharing the burden can be found, so that the billionaires
get richer and the number of people in poverty grows, then a peaceful
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solution may not be possible. U nder sim ilar pressures, form ally
democratic states in Latin America (Chile, Uraguay) succumbed to
military dictatorships in the 1970s. This option seems possible, but not
likely, for concensus politics have certainly not broken down here yet.
3) Inequality plus fragmentation and quiescence
In this option the breakdown of social solidarity takes the form, not of
polarization, but o f fragm entation. Politics becom es increasingly
meaningless, as the lack of real power of parliaments can no longer be
concealed. Since the decisions are made in die stock exchanges of Tokyo,
London and New York, and in the international corporate bureaucracies,
why bother anyway? The result is hopelessness, hedonism and retreat into
the private sphere. Protest takes the form of life-styles and sub-cultural
pressure groups, and can easily be co-opted by the leisure industries.
Increasing drug and alcohol addiction, fundamentalist religion, mental
illness and violence are products of the real powerlessness of the social
being. Politics shift from interests to values, providing a focus for "New
Right" ideologies of family, individuality and competition. This seems the
most likely scenario of all, for it is simply an extrapolation of existing
trends.
4) Equality plus real communalitv
An alternative to these less than inspiring possibilities is a society based on
the best elements of national Australian tradition, the most important
postulates of multiculturalism, and the needs and interests of the broad
majority of the population. Such a political and cultural re-orientation
would transcend any idea of nationalism, nation-state or simply imagined
community.
The Australian traditions which should be re-asserted are not those of
colonization or war, but those of the "fair go", that is of social justice for
all. The image of Australia which should be brought back is that of the
"workingman's paradise", though the racist and sexist aspects of this ideal
would need to be worked through and modified.
The aspects of multiculturalism worth maintaining are the principles of
cultural self-determination and of cosmopolitan identity. They must be
linked to measures to meet the of specific needs of discriminated and
disadvantaged groups, policies to overcome structural marginalization
and labour market segmentation, and to combat racism.
Above all, the history of white racism and genocide against the
Aborigines must become a central theme of education and public debate,
and an accommodation with the Aborigines must be achieved through
payment of reparations, Land Rights legislation, and a treaty. Steps must
be taken to improve dramatically the economic and social situation of the
Aboriginal population, not through welfare measures, but through
making adequate resources available to Aboriginal communities and these
being placed under their own control.
Any such strategy must be based on an attempt to re-define the basis of
social organization, and to move away from a political emphasis on the

nation-state. Our life today is determined as much by events on the local
level, as by those on the level of world politics and economics. In Britain,
it has been local politics which have provided hope in the wasteland of
Thatcherism. There is no contradiction between attempts to build
community and bring about change at the local level, political work in the
national arena, and participation in world politics.
The Bicentenary could have been an occasion for celebration. The
opportunity was throw n aw ay by A ustralian political leaders’
unwillingness to face up to the real issues and problems. Once the decision
was taken to ignore A boriginal dem ands for real expiation, the
Bicentenary became a lost cause. It changed from something with potential
social meaning to a public relations exercise. Bicentennial Authority
propaganda let the cat out of the bag, by calling for the the inclusion of
youth, women, ethnic groups, Aborigines and the handicapped in the
celebrations. The conclusion was inescapable: only white Anglo middleclass men really had anything to celebrate in Australia; the inclusion of the
rest was tokenism. If the Bicentenary had been concerned with helping to
create an all-embracing society, it would have been based on real changes,
designed to secure equality not only for the groups mentioned, but also to
bring in others, whose marginalization makes them invisible for those in
power: the unemployed, those living below the poverty line, the industrial
casualties, the deprived.
The Bicentenary is yet another indication of how the concept of the
nation has become ideological and exclusionary, failing to embrace most
of the population. The group which wields power and benefits from it gets
ever smaller. More and more of us are members of minorities. Building
communality means taking the real situation in our cities, suburbs and
country areas as a starting point, adopting political and economic forms
which correspond with the needs and interests of the many groups who are
voiceless at present, and working for change everywhere. We do not need
a new ideology of nationhood. We need to transcend the nation, as an
obsolete and increasingly obsolete relic of early industrialism. Our aim
must be community without nation.
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